When Brezinski offered $ 400 million in aid over two years , Zia turned down the offer as a ” peanuts ” a gratuitous insult to Carter , a peanut farmer from Georgia .
On Jan 10 , 1980 , the first CIA provided arms for the mujahedin arrived in Pakistan via the ISI .
Author
Bruce Riedel
The pro – Soviet coup in Kabul forced Carter to change his view of Pakistan . The country that he had literally flown over in 1978 was now critical to stopping the Soviets . To Carter , shaken by the fall of the Shah of Iran and by the Marxist coup in Kabul , it looked as if Southwest Asia were crumbling into enemy hands . In July 1979 , Carter ordered the CIA to provide modest assistance to the rebelion against the communist government in Kabul , but this aid was low level , involving mostly propaganda support and very modest amounts of money but no weapons .
The Soviet invasion cemented the change in Washington , and it would lead to a renewal of America’s cold war love affair with the Pakistani army and inter – services Intelligence . Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski travelled to Pakistan after the invasion and offered more assistance for the mojahedin and for Pakistan . When Brezinski offered $ 400 million in aid over two years , Zia turned down the offer as a ” peanuts ” a gratuitous insult to Carter , a peanut farmer from Georgia . But Zia allowed the bilateral relationship between the ISI and the Saudis General Intelligence Directorate to become a trilateral CIA-ISI-GID relationship in which washington and Riyadh provided matching grants of money and purchased arms and Islamabad handled distribution and training . On Jan 10 , 1980 , the first CIA provided arms for the mujahedin arrived in Pakistan via the ISI .
Akhter vastly expanded the size and strength of the service and much of its growth was design to wage jihad in Afghanistan
Author
Bruce Riedel
The Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence grew . Zia’s handpicked choice for director general in 1979 was a Pashtun , Akhter Abdul Rehman , better known simply as General Akhter . He hated publicity and the press and avoided being photographed . Akhter , whom his subordinates described as ” a cold , reserved personality , almost inscrutable , always secretive was a gifted intelligence officer , and he knew afghan world well . He developed close working ties to many of Afghan mujahedin leaders , especially fellow pashtuns , and organised them into political parties to give more legitimacy to their struggle . Akhter also built strong ISI links to the CIA and the Saudis . He was the first director general of tha ISI that i met with .
At Zia’s directions , Akhter vastly expanded the size and strength of the service . According to one estimate , the ISI went from a staff of 2000 in 1978 to 40000 employees and a billion dollar budget by 1988. It came to be seen in Pakistan as omnipotent , listening in on every phone call, planting informants in every village , city , block and public space . Politicians were on its payroll and the enemies simply disappeared . Much of its growth was design to keep Zia in power , but much of it was also to wage jihad . As one ot Akhter’s deputies would later say , ” the ISI was and still is probably the most powerful and influential organisation in the country ” ; he also remarked that Akhter was ” regarded with envy or fear ” , even by his fellow officers.
First ever visit of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 04 August 1987September 25, 2019 - 2:05 pm
