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Avoiding Armageddon 4

Avoiding Armageddon 4

When Brezinski offered $ 400 million in aid over two years , Zia turned down the offer as a ” peanuts ” a gratuitous insult to Carter , a peanut farmer from Georgia .

On Jan 10 , 1980 , the first CIA provided arms for the mujahedin arrived in Pakistan via the ISI .

Author

Bruce Riedel

The pro – Soviet coup in Kabul forced Carter to change his view of Pakistan . The country that he had literally flown over in 1978 was now critical to stopping the Soviets . To Carter , shaken by the fall of the Shah of Iran and by the Marxist coup in Kabul , it looked as if Southwest Asia were crumbling into enemy hands . In July 1979 , Carter ordered the CIA to provide modest assistance to the rebelion against the communist government in Kabul , but this aid was low level , involving mostly propaganda support and very modest amounts of money but no weapons .

The Soviet invasion cemented the change in Washington , and it would lead to a renewal of  America’s cold war love affair with the Pakistani army and inter – services Intelligence . Carter’s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski travelled to Pakistan after the invasion and offered more assistance for the mojahedin and for Pakistan . When Brezinski offered $ 400 million in aid over two years , Zia turned down the offer as a ” peanuts ” a gratuitous insult to Carter , a peanut farmer from Georgia . But Zia allowed the bilateral relationship between the ISI and the Saudis General Intelligence Directorate to become a trilateral CIA-ISI-GID relationship in which washington and Riyadh provided matching grants of money and purchased arms and Islamabad handled distribution and training . On Jan 10 , 1980 , the first CIA provided arms for the mujahedin arrived in Pakistan via the ISI .

Avoiding Armageddon

The Carter and Reagan years

page 95

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Avoiding Armageddon 2

Avoiding Armageddon 2

ISI under Gen Akhter Abdul Rehman’s command

Akhter vastly expanded the size and strength of the service and  much of its growth  was design to wage jihad in Afghanistan

Author

Bruce Riedel

The Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence grew . Zia’s handpicked choice for director general in 1979 was a Pashtun , Akhter Abdul Rehman , better known simply as General Akhter . He hated publicity and the press and avoided being photographed . Akhter , whom his subordinates described as ” a cold , reserved personality , almost inscrutable , always secretive was a gifted intelligence officer , and he knew afghan world well . He developed close working ties to many of Afghan mujahedin leaders , especially fellow pashtuns , and organised them into political parties to give more legitimacy to their struggle . Akhter also built strong ISI links to the CIA and the Saudis . He was the first director general of tha ISI that i met with .

At Zia’s directions , Akhter vastly expanded the size and strength of the service . According to one estimate , the ISI went from a staff of 2000 in 1978 to 40000 employees and a billion dollar budget by 1988. It came to be seen in Pakistan as omnipotent , listening in on every phone call, planting informants in every village , city , block and public space . Politicians were on its payroll and the enemies simply disappeared . Much of its growth was design to keep Zia in power , but much of it was also to wage jihad . As one ot Akhter’s deputies would later say , ” the ISI was and still is probably the most powerful and influential organisation in the country ” ; he also remarked that Akhter was ” regarded with envy or fear ” , even by his fellow officers. 

Avoiding Armageddon

The Carter and Reagan years

page 88

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